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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

.
..

JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN,
PlaintiffRespondant.

Case No.· 18,132

.•
.•
.•
.

vs.
KENT CHRISTIANSEN,
DefendantAppellant

APPELLANT, KENT CHRISTIANSEN'S BRIEF ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
This is a post divorce modification proceeding in which
plaintiff-respondent, Jana

c·.

Christiansen, (hereinafter,

"plaintiff") brought this modification proceeding to increase
defendant-appellant Kent Christiansen's (hereinafter
"defendant") child support obligations to plaintiff under a
Decree of Divorce, dated July 17, 1979.

Plaintiff also sought

an award of attorneys fees (R.27-29). Other issues raised by
plaintiff's initial order to show cause were disposed of
prior to the trial date herein.
petition seeking primarily to:

Defendant filed a Counter1) reduce the amount of alimony payments

to $100. 0.0 per month; ·2) set a fixed date for termination of
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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alimony payments; and 3) eliminate the requirement from the
Decree of Divorce that the defendant be required to maintain
the plaintiff on his health and medical insurance policy (R.36-38)

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT

The matter came on for trial on September 3, 1981,
before the Honorable George E. Ballif, District Judge presiding.

Following the conclusion of the trial and introduction

of evidence and testimony from both parties, the Court took
the matter under advisement and rendered its Decision
on October 8, 1981.

A copy of the Court's Decision is attached

hereto as Appendix "A" and incorporated by reference.
The trial court increased the amount of the defendant's
child support payments from $275.00 per month (R.22-23)
to $450.00 per month- per child for each of the parties two
minor children (R.46).
The trial court also ruled that the defendant had failed
to show a sufficient change in circumstances to justify the
reduction or elimination of the alimony previously ordered
in the Decree of Divorce.

The Court also concluded that the

defendant should pay $200.00 as attorneys fees for the use and
benefit of the plaintiff's counsel. (R.46)

The Court did not

rule on the other issues raised by the defendant's order to
show cause specifically that the defendant be released from the
requirement to maintain the plaintiff on his health and
medical insurance policies.
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The trial court overruled and denied the defendant's
objections to the Findings of Fact and Modified Decree
and defendant's Notice of Appeal was filed on November 25,
1981 (R.56,57).

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Defendant seeks the following relief on appeal:

( 1) A

reversal of the trial court's decision that the defendant
failed to show a sufficient material change in circumstances
to justify a reduction or elimination of the amount of alimony payments
paid by the defendant to the ~laintiff; or, alternatively a
remand ·to the trial court to set an appropriate reduction
in alimony payments.

(2)

A

reversal of the trial court's decision

increasing the amount of child support payments from $275.00
per month per child to $450.00 per month per child for each of
the parties two minor children.

(3) An order from this Court

terminating the defendant's responsibility to maintain· and pay
for health and medical insurance coverage for plaintiff.

(4) A reversal or alternatively a reduction of the court's
award of attorneys fees.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and defendant were married at Provo, Utah, on
June 1, 1972. There were two children born as issue of the

.. -3Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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said marriage to-wit:

Alicia, who at the time of the Decree

of Divorce was 3 years old; and Chad, who at the time of the
Decree of Divorce was age 16 months (R.18).

In July of 1979,

the parties entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement
agreement (R.14-16) which formed the basis of a Decree of
Divorce which was subsequently entered by the Court following
a hearing on July 17, 1979.

The stipulation and property settlement

agreement is attached hereto, labeled Appendix "B" and incorporated
by its reference herein.

The lower c6urt·•s Finding of Fact,

Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce approved the previously
executed Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (Appendix
uB") which granted the plaintiff alimony in the amount of $650.00

per month, and child support in the amount of $275.00 per month
for each of the parties two minor children (R.22,23).
At the time of the original divorce hearing and the entry·
of the Decree of Divorce, the lower court specifically found
that "Plaintiff has no income" see Finding of Fact number 9,
(R.20), and Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement,
paragraph 9, (R.16). The minute entry entered by the court at the
time of the hearing on the Decree of Divorce reflects the ·
presence of the plaintiff and her counsel, Noall T. Wootton,
and further reflects that the defendant was not present, but
was represented by his counsel, Wayne B. Watson.

The trial

court further reflects.in its minute entry of July 17, ~979,
that "counsel stated for the record that plaintiff has "0"
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income at this time" (R.25). A copy of the court's minute

entry dated July 17, 1979 is attached hereto as Appendix "C"
and incorporated by reference.
The defendant is a self-employed dentist, with a specialty
in endotonics (R.78,124).

At the time of the Decree of

Divorce, the Court made specific findings that the defendant's
net income was approximately $30,000.00 for the calendar
year 1978 (R.19). It should be noted that the Decree of
Divorce was granted on July 17, 1979 at a time when defendant's
income had.probably increased slightly.

Defendant opened a

private practice in dentistry in Provo, Utah on approximately
May 1, 1978, a little more than one year prior to the entry

of the· Decree of Divorce (R.125).
At the time of the modification hearing, defendant
testified that he was drawing a base monthly salary

o~

approximately

$3,000.00 per month from his business which is now a professional corporation (R.134).

Defendant's 1980 individual

income tax return demonstrated that he had an adjusted gross
income of $30,538.00 for the year 1980 {see exhibit #5).

In

response to an order of the court, the defendant produced his
complete individual income tax returns for the years 1979
and 1980 and his corporate income tax return for the year
beginning June 1, 1980, and ending March 30, 1981.

While

not all of those documents were marked as exhibits, they
were produced following the trial pursuant to the request of
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counsel for the plaintiff and are included in the court's
record in the exhibit file.
At the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce,

Plaintiff testified

plaintiff had no income (R.16,20,25 and 145).

that she had obtained a Masters Degree in Educational Psychology

~

and at the time of the modification hearing was making $779.50

w,

per month gross and approximately $550.00 net by working three

ill

days per week as an Educational Psychologist in the Provo School

~

District (R.80,89 See also, plaintiff's Exhibit #4).
The court further heard testimony from both the plaintiff
and the defendant to the effect that full time employment may
be available to the plaintiff through the Provo School District
provided that her arthritic condition would permit her to accept
such full time employment (R.80,141).

Both plaintiff and

defendant testified that the plaintiff's arthritic condition had
stabalized since the time of the Decree of Divorce and that the
plaintiff was able to function fairly well by taken medication
that was prescribed for the arthritic condition (R.82,142): Plaintif:
was presently very active and had recently taken up skiing (R.
142,143).

Both parties introduced evidence and were cross-examined
concerning their monthly current expenses.

Plaintiff listed

month~

current expenses of $2,197.00 which she claimed had increased
approximately $1,400.00 since the date of the entry of the Decree
of Divorce (See plaintiff's exhibit #3, R.110, 112).

Defendant

claimed monthly current expenses of $3,166.24 including the
alimony and support payments imposed

hu

+-ho
'

... ,_,

<~·

·--

no,..,....oo

..__

'-~->'

' - "'

~

-

~--

,,_,_,
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Both parties

i:c~stified

$16, 000., 00 i.n c.1!>h property
paragraph

1~7

that the pa:t. ties contemplated the
Sf?ti:le.'1c~nt

oi: the Occree of Oi.vorcc~

referred to in
(lL23) wouj d be used in

purchasing the condo11inium that plaint i.
in, and furthee, l:hai: the condo.1inium

i~

r:

llf.JS

presently resides
purchased contemporaneously

with the entry of the Decree of Divo.i::ce (R .• 100,14-.~.>)'>

plaintiff's own test:imony in th:1t

rc~qat·d

·'rhe

is particularly reveal j ng

Snyder)
Now, at the~ t.i.me of the Decree of
Divorce, you also had made plan~-) to purchas(~ the
condominium that you are presently living inv hadn't
Q:

(By Mr)

you?
(By Mrs~

Cht""istiansen)
I had hoped that I could.

A:

,· .-

Q.:

'Th(~

deal wasn't finalized.

.

But you we:t:.e 90.in.g~.t.n.ga..l.{ St6!f.ono.~GU..
cash settlement that you received from

in
your husband,
and had already made an offer to purchase the condominium in American Fork, subject to your getting that
money and closing the rest of the f i.nancial arrangements,

hadn't you·?

A:

Yes.

Q:

And you did, in fact,. :·!ake that $16,000(< 00 settlement

and purchased the condominium that you are presently
living in, isnt that true?

A:
-Q:

Yes, that is true.

So these additional living expenses that you are point-

ing to, these addi t_ional house payments, totaling
$3l5e00 in increases, were something that you contemplated
at the time of the Decree of Dlvorce?

A:

Yes.

(R~J.00,

101)

Plaintiff further testifieo wi i:t:. re9ard to her expenses

that at the time of the Decree of D.i.-vorce, she was driving

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-7-

~

a 1975 Mustang II automobile which was paid for and that since
the entry of the Decree of Divorce, she had gone out and
purchased a 1980 Camaro (R.102). Plaintiff further
testified in accordance with her exhibit #3 that she had
$100.00 per month in medical expenses but later conceded
that her husband pays for all of her bills for medication
and her doctors expenses,

(Re92).

Furthermore, since· the

entry of the Decree of Divorce, she had purchased drapes and
a refrigerator for the house, and had taken out a loan with a
monthly payment of $131.50 on that amount.

(R.114).

In connection with the loan payment in the amount of $131.50
for the drapes and refrigerator, plaintiff testified as follows:

Q:
(By Mr. Snyder) Let me ask you just briefly
about the loan payment.
That was something you contemplated in connection with the purchase of your condominium, isn't that true?
A:

(By Mrs. Christiansen)

(By Mr. Snyder)

You

No.

knew-~excuse

me.

Go ahead.

A:
I guess I really didnt have any idea how much things
cost at the time of the divorce.
I realized we had
nothing. But I had no idea as to the cost of the drapes
and a fridge and just the bear necessities.

Q: But in truth and in fact, you knew that you were going
to have to buy a refrigerator for that condominium, and
you were going to have to put some drapes in it, and
that type of thing, and you knew that in connection with the
purchase of the condominium, and you contemplated doing
that at the time of the Decree, isn't that true? You may not
have known the price, but you knew you were going to have
to get a refrigerator and drapes?
A:
I knew I was going to have to get a refrigerator. Kent
gave me $16,000.00, and I paid down $15,000.00, so I figured
-8-
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the extra $1000.00 I could use on a fridge and a few things.
But I just didn't - I guess I figured that, but I didn't
realize that the drapes and all those things would come
to so much. Am I saying too much?
(R.113,114}
It is interesting to note that the court in its decision
cited the increased expense of $250.00 per month for child
care, necessitated by the plaintiff obtaining employment, but
failed to consider or recognize the fact that plaintiff had
increased income which would more than off-set that expense.
{R.45,89.

See also, exhibit #4).

Plaintiff also int.ro-

duced evidence concerning increased expenses necessitated
by the purchase of the washer and dryer which were purchased
by the plaintiff following the initiation of the order to show
cause proceeding and which washer and dryer had not even
been delivered to the plaintiff at the time of the trial of
this matter (R.104).
Plaintiff claimed additional increases in expenses due to
inflation, but the only dollar amounts presented as evidence
with respect to increases in the expenses of the children
were an additional $10.00 per month charge, for pre-school
costs for the parties son {R.93).
Plaintiff also claimed increased expenses attributed to
the children's recreation, and the daughter's clothing, but
failed to present any evidence concerning amounts (R.92,94).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
FAILING TO GRANT THE DEFENDANT A DECREASE IN THE
AMOUNT OF ALIMONY PAYMENTS BASED UPON THE PLAINTIFF'S
INCREASED INCOME.
It is axiomatic that the district courts of this state
are vested with considerable discretion with regard to alimony,
child support and attorney's fees.

On appeal, the decisions

of the the district courts are accorded great deference:
In a divorce case, even though the proceedings are
equitable and this court may review the evidence, this
court accords considerable deference to the findings
and judgment of the trial court due to its advantageous position.
On appeal this court will not disturb
the action of the trial court unless the evidence
clearly preponderates to the contrary, or the trial
court has abused its discretion, or misapplied principles
of law •••
Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218 at 1222
(Utah 1980).
Mindful of the burden he bears on appeal, defendant
requests this court to reverse the lower court's decision that

a sufficient change in circumstances was not shown to
justify the reduction or elimination of alimony paid by
defendant to the plaintiff (R.46), upon the grounds that the
lower court misunderstood and/or misapplied the law, resulting

in substantial and prejudicial error, and/or perpetrated such
a serious inequity as to constitute an abuse of the court's

discretion.

This concept was explained by the court in

Mccrary v. Mccrary, 599 P.2d 1248, at 1250 (Utah 1979):
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In these matters, a party seeking a reversal
of the trial court must prove a misunderstanding or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial
and prejudicial error, or that the evidence clearly
preponderated against the findings or that such
a serious inequity resulted from the order as to
constitute an abuse of the trial court's discretion •

•

•

•

The purpose of alimony is to "provide support for the wife
as nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed
during the marriage, and to prevent the wife from becomming
a public charge".
1977}.

English v. English, 565 P.2d 409 (Utah,

This calls for determining "the financial conditions and

needs of the wife, the ability of the wife to procure sufficient
income for herself, and the ability of the husband to
tG provide support".

Id. at 412.

The courts have held that the factors to be considered in
determining whether to modify an alimony award are the same as
the factors taken into consideration when granting an
award for support and alimony.

See Scott v. Scott, 591 P.2d

980 (Arizona, 1979).
In Gramme v. Gramme, 597 P.2d 134 (Utah, 1978), this court
stated the purpose of ·an award of alimony and the criteria
upon which an award of alimony may be based:

The purpose of alimony is to provide
post-marital support; it is intended neither
as a penalty imposed upon the husband nor as a
reward granted to the wife.
Its function is to
provide support for the wife as nearly as
possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during
marriage and to prevent her from becomming a public
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

charge.
Important criteria in dete:mining a
reasonable ~ward for support and maintenance
are the financial conditions and needs of the wife,
considering her station in life; her ability to
produce sufficient inco"me for herself; and the
ability of the husband to provide the support.
(Emphasis is added)

·Id.at 147 (footnotes omitted)*

By applying the criteria as described in Gramme the plaintiff
herein is no longer entitled to an award of alimony.

Her present

earnings are sufficient to support her at the standard of
living she enjoyed during her marriage to the defendant.
There is no indication that her financial situation could
deteriorate to the point of making her a public charge.
The lower court should have considered her young age, her
ability to work and her present income with regard to the issue
of reduction of alimony.
In that regard, at the time of the Decree of Divorce,
the plaintiff, Jana Christiansen was unemploy~d. The court
entered a specific findings to that r~gard (R.16,20,25 and
142).

Since that time she has used her Masters Degree in

Educational Psychology (R.80) to become gainfully employed
at the Provo School District as an educational psychologist
working three days a week.

Both plaintiff and defendant

testified that the plaintiff could obtain full time employment
through the Provo School District (R.80, 141).

Both plaintiff

and defendant also testified that the plaintiff's arthritic
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condition had stabilized with medication since the time of
the entry of the Decree of Divorce.

The uncontroverted

evidence introduced at the time of the trial in this matter
indicated that the plaintiff was earning approximately
$800.00 per month gross, and $550.00 per month net (R.89,141,
see also, plaintiff's exhibit #4).
Quite clearly, the plaintiff is now earning a substantial
salary which she was not earning at the time of the entry of
the Decree of Divorce and is capable of earning even more if
she chooses to accept full time employment.
The trial court chose to ignore the Findings of Fact, Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, and the court's
own minute entry from the divorce hearing settipg for the fact that
the plaintiff had no income at the time of the Decree of
Divorce.

The rationale behind the court's ruling is found

in a discussion between the Court and counsel for the defendant
which occurred during argument and following the conclusion of the
evidence.

That discussion is set forth in the transcript

as follows:
{Argument by Mr. Snyder):

I think the evidence

demonstrates a material change in circumstances with regard
to her income that justifies decreasing the amount of
the alimony.

I think that that's a material change.

The Findings of the Court clearly reflect-THE COURT:

If she can't go up, why should we
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refuse it?
MR. SNYDER:
THE COURT:

If she can't go up where?
If she can't get an increase in

alimony because he's earning additional money, why can't
she be subject, then, to a reduction?

MR. SNYDER:

That was all done, as far as the

stipulation--THE COURT:

--I know.

Why should she, then

also be restricted and reduced?
MR. SNYDER:

Because the Court made a specific

finding concerning the fact that she had no income,
and she now does have an income.
THE COURT:

I know, but it was set at a certain

amount of money.
MR. SNYDER:
THE COURT:

Yes.
And she could not use his increased

income to go up.
MR. SNYDER:
THE COURT:

Right.
Nothing was said that if she increased

her income, she could go down.
MR. SNYDER:

No, but that, in·rny opinion,

is a material change of circumstances which justifies the
Court in reducing the amount of that alimony.
income at the time of the divorce.
time, and she has income now.

She had no

She hacl no income at that

That's a change in circumstances

which is material to the issues of alimony and the amount
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that it was set· at, and justifies it being decreased.
Furthermore, I think there is merit in the
position that this Court ought not to let that alimony
go on interminably forever.

She is now employed; she is

now able to earn her own way; she is not contributing to the
income and the needs of the children, which she has not done
before.
think those issues mandate a change in the amount--

I

reducing the amount-THE COURT:

--You want the benefit of that, then,

when it comes to the support of the children,.the fact that
she is working, in addition to the fact that that should
reduce her income, and also reduGe-MR. SNYDER:

--I think' that the Court should

definitely-THE

COURT:

--Mr. Snyder, when the Court is talking

don't cut in on me, will you, please.
MR. SNYDER:

Excuse me.

THE COURT:

Did you hear what I said?

MR. SNYDER:

Yes I did.

THE" COURT:
MR. SNYDER:

All right.
I

You may respond to it.

think that if the Court is not going

to consider it in the question of alimony, which I think the
Court should, then I think the Court should definitely
consider it with regard to the matter of the child support,
and her claims for needs for an increase.

(R.161 line 21 through
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Rl63 line 20).
The trial court's concerns reflect his interpretation of
a portion of paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and Property
Settlement, (R.16)(Appendix "B") which is incorporated into the
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, paragraph 9 (R.20).

The

Property Settlement Agreement (Appendix "B") reads, in pertinent
part
9. The parties further stipulate that· they.hereby
request the Court to make a finding of fact that the
plaintiff presently has no income, and that future
increases in alimony shallbe based solely upon plaintiff's
economic needs without any regard whatsoever to a
possible increase in d~fendant's incom~ status."
(Emphasis added) {R.16}.
It was the trial judge's opinion that if the. plaintiff
cannot use the defendant's increased income to seek future
increases in her alimony payments, then the defendant should
not be able to use plaintiff's increased income to justify
reductions in the alimony payments.
The trial court's interpretation of paragraph 9 of the
Findings of Fact and the Property Settlement Agreement,
clearly ignores the language contained in the first part of
paragraph 9 to the effect that the plaintiff has no income
and indeed, the language set forth by both parties' counsel
on the record in the Minute Entry (Appendix "C") to the
effect that the plaintiff has "0" income at this time.

(R.25).

Utah courts have long held that increases in income
constitute a material change in circumstances sufficient to
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justify the increase or decrease in the amount of alimony
payments.

In the case of Dehm v. Dehm, 545 P.2d 525 (Utah,

1976) the husband sought to reduce or eliminate alimony
payments.

In Dehm, at the time the Divorce Decree was entered, the

wife had income of approximately $220.00 per month, and the
husband earned $1,300.00 per month.

By the time of the modification

proceedings those numbers had increased to $946.00 and $2,200.00
respectively.

Also, during the period of time between the entry

of the Decree of Divorce and the modification hearing the wife
had received her Bachelors and Masters Degree and had become
employed on a full time basis.

The Utah Supreme Court affirmed

the trial court's decision reducing the alimony from $300.00 per
month to $1.00 per year and found that under the circumstances,
alimony was neither necessary nor reasonable.
The written Decision (See Appendix "A") entered by the trial
·court in this matter sheds further light on the trial court's
unilateral attempt to modify the provisions of the Stipulation
and Property Settlement Agreement and the Findings of Fact entered
by the trial court.

It is clear from the language of the Stipulation

and Property Settlement Agreement that the plaintiff in this
case agreed as part of that Stipulation and Property Settlement
that she would not seek increased alimony based upon increases
in the defendant's income.

The trial court apparently felt

-17-
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,,

that

'What is good for the goose must be good for the gander".

No

,.

such element of resciprosity can be inferred from the Stipulation
or from the Findings of Fact, yet the trial judge in the modification
hearing found that the plaintiff's agreement to not seek increased
alimony based upon increases in the defendant's income should be applie;t:
in reverse to the defendant. In other words, he should not
h11

JI .

be able to claim decreases in alimony based upon increases
in the plaintiff's income.

•

The trial court's Decision

(Appendix. "A") reveals some additional information concerning
the court's analysis with regard to paragraph 9 of the Findings of
Fact and the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement.

COU!

Judge

Ballif in his Decision states:
"Ba.sea upon the above and fore.going findings,
and upon the finding in the Decree of Divorce that
only the plaintiff's economic needs, without regard
to defendant's income, is the sole basis for
increase in alimony and the further finding by the
Court that the plaintiff's personal needs have not
materially increased in that she has now obtained
employment and is providing partially for her own
support, the court concludes as follows:
• • • • •

.. . .
._

"--~ ... ·~

2. The Court further concludes that a sufficient
change of circumstance has not been shown to justify the
reduction or elimination of the alimony paid by
defendant to plaintiff and the amount provided in
the original decree shall continue." (R.46).
It is axiomatic the provisions of a Stipulation and
Property Settlement Agreement which are approved and incorporated
into a Decree of Divorce cannot be subsequently modified
or changed absent a showing of substantial injustice, fraud
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,, .
"'
'• '

'•,

or some other compelling reason.

See Lay v. Lay, 162 Colo. 143,

425 P.2d 704 and Foulger v. Foulger, 626 P.2d 412 (Utah 1981).
In the instant case the trial court has attempted to
impose its own judgment effectively modifying the parties'
Stipulation and effectively undertaking to unilateraly modify
the parties' Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
by making a provision that is clearly applicable only to
increases in alimony apply in reverse to decreases in alimony.
The trial court has ignored the other findings of the
court concerning plaintiff's income at the time of the entry of
the Decree of Divorce and the uncontroverted evidence concerning
the plaintiff's increases in income at the time of the
modification hearing.
Defendant submits that alimony is not a matter of right.

When

the wife has the ability to earn a living, it is not the
policy of the law to give her a perpetual lien on her divorced
husband's future income.

See Morgan v. Morgan, 369 P.2d 516

(Washington, 1962).
Utah courts have long recognized the principal that increased earning capacity of the wife, following the entry of
the Decree of Divorce, constitute

a material change in

circumstances which is sufficient to justify the court in
reducing alimony payments.
1972).

(A

See King v. King,

495 P.2d 823, (Utah,

case similar to the instant case in that the former wife

had a health condition at the time of the divorce which prevented
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her from seekirt;J and acceptirg gainful employment.

That situation was at least

partially resolved, and alimony payments were reduced fran $250. 00 P=r month
to $100.00 per nonth for a period of six months and thereafter to. the sum of
$50. oo per month for a :period of one year, after which, alimony was to terminate
entirely).

See also, Carter v. Ca.rter, 584 P.2d 904, (Utah 1978),

(Carter

is a case that is significant in that it was tried in the sa.ne district court

and by the same trial judge as the instant case.

In carter, the court reduced

the defendant wife's alimony fran $350.00 per rronth to $100.00

~r-rnonth

on

the basis that the defendant, who was not employed at the time of the entry

of the Decree of Divorce, had beoorne employed and had a monthly salary of $636.27. ,
The Utah State Supreme Court in Carter held that one of the important factors-

to be considered is that it should be the PJlicy of the law to encourage a person
receivir.g alimony to seek employment.

Id, at 905.)

other case citations havirtJ similar holdirgs have been omitted for the
sake of brevity.
~fendant

submits that he is entitled to have the Court consider plaintiff 1 s

increased incane as bearirg on the question of reduc·ir.g the defendant's alifno!lY
payments herein and that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing its
CJNn.

interpretation· of paragraph 9 of the Stipulation and Property Settlerrent

~reerrent

and the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to effectively hold

that if the plaintiff had could not claim future increases in alimony based

up:>n increases in the defendant's incane status, that the defendant could not
base a decrease in alimony payments up::>n the plaintiff 1 s incane status.

Such

a holding by the trial court clearly controverts the expressed provisions of
the parties' Stipulation, (Appendix "B"), and the findirgs made by the trial
court at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and constitutes an abuse
of discretion. ·
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
INCREASING CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS FROM
$275.00 PER MONTH PER CHILD TO $450.00
PER MONTH PER CHILD FOR EACH OF THE
PARTIES' TWO MINOR CHILDREN.

A.

THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY CONSIDERED PLAINTIFF'S

INCREASED STANDARD OF LIVING AND INFLATED EXPENSES IN ORDER
TO JUSTIFY INCREASED CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS.
As indicated previously, it is well settled in this
State that the modification of a divorce decree is. a matter
of equity and that it is the duty and prerogative of the
Supreme Court to review both the facts and the law in each
case.

Furthermore, the burden rests with the party seeking

the modification of a divorce decree to show a substantial
change in circumstances such as to warrant a modification.
See Christensen v. Christensen,

6~8

P.2d.1297 (Utah 1981).

In the same way that the defendant has the burden of demonstrating a material change in circumstances such as to
justify a decrease in the amount of alimony payments, the
plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating a material change
in circumstances such as would justify an increase in the
child support payments.
In the trial court's Decision (Appendix A), the court
found that the expenses of the plaintiff in rearing the
minor children had increased by virtue of inflation since
the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce on July 17,
1979, and correctly pointed out that the expenses of the
minor children were not established by any Findings of Fact
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or stipulations on file herein at the time the decree was
entered.

The court further found that there were other

increases in expenses in that the plaintiff has

acquired

new living facilities for herself and the children and had
obtained employment which created an increased expense of
$250.00 per month for child care.

(R. 45)

The court further

observed that other expenses such as dancing and other
lessons for the children were given only minimal weight by
the court in arriving at an increase in child support that
is justifiable under the changed circumstances of the
children's needs.

(R. 45-47)

Addressing first the issue of the plaintiff's increased
expenses, it is significant to note that the plaintiff
claims total monthly living expenses of $2,197.29 and that
her monthly living expenses have increased by $1,397.29 in
the two· years between the entry of the Decree of Divorce and
the modification hearing.

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3.)

When questioned on cross-examination concerning the figures
recited on Exhibit 3, plaintiff responded as follows:
Q (By Mr. Snyder) And you have listed that

you have total monthly expenses of roughly
$2200.00, $2197.29, ri~ht?
·

A (By Mrs. Christiansen) Yes.
Q

And you say that those expenses have
increased since the divorce by roughly
$1400.00, $1397.29?

A

Yes.

Q So at the time of the Decree of Divorce
you mu~t have had monthly expenses of
approximately $800.00, is that correct?
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A Approximately.
Q

And yet at that time, at the time of the
Decree of Divorce, you and your husband
had alimony and support payments~-your
husband began paying you support payments
and alimony totaling $1200.00, is that right?

A Yes.
Q

He has been paying you that amount since the
time of the Decree, hasn't he?

A Yes.
Q Did you spend all of that money each month
when it would come in?

A No, because I started with a house payment
the next month after we were divorced, and
that house payment was $590.00. So I didn't
have any spending money.
(R. 111-112)

The significance of the above testimony from the plaintiff is two-fold.

One, it. indicates that at the time of the

entry of the Decree of Divorce, that the plaintiff had
expenses only of $800.00 and yet she and the defendant
agreed in a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
that the defendant would pay a total of $1,200.00 ($550.00
child support and $650.00 alimony) towards the support and
maintenance of the plaintiff and the minor children.

The

plaintiff further indicates. by her testimony that the payment
of $1,200.00 in total support and maintenance considered the
fact that she was going to be moving into the condominium
which has a house payment of $590.00 per month together with
increased utility expenses that were testified to by the
plaintiff.

(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3 and R. 118).
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The

plaintiff further testified as follows:
Q

Now, at the time of the Decree
of Divorce, you also had made plans to purchase
the condominium that you are presently living
in, hadn't you?

A

(By Mrs. Christiansen)

The deal wasn't finalized.
I had hoped that I could.

Q

But you were going to pay $16,000.00 in cash

(By Mr. Snyder)

settlement that you received from you husband,
and had already made an of fer to purchase the
condominium in American Fork, subject to your
getting that money and closing the rest of the
financial arrangements,· hadn't you?
A

Yes.

Q

And you did, in fact, make that $16,000.00
settlement and purchased the condominium that
you are presently living in~ isn't that true?

A

Yes, that's true.

Q

So these additional. living expenses that you are
pointing to, these additional house payments
totaling $315.00 in increases, were something
that you contemplated at the time of the Decree
of Divorce?

A

Yes.

(R. 100-101)

Similarly, the defendant testified:
Q

(By Mr. Snyder) Now, at the time of the signing
of the Stipulation, just prior to the divorce
in this matter, you were living in a rented
housei is that correct?

A (By Mr. Christiansen) Right. She moved into
the condominium, and then I moved back into
the home where we were residing for a couple
of months until they got home in the middle
of December, or whatever.
Q

She had been living in that house while you
had been separated, is that correct?

A

Correct.
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Q

And is it true that she received some settlement
funds in the Decree in the amount of $16,000.00,
and she used those funds partially for the down
payment on the condominium?

A

Correct.

(R. 144-145)
Plaintiff also testified concerning a loan payment in
the amount of $131.50 which was used to pay for drapes and a
refrigerator which were purchased for the condominium.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 3).

(See

On cross-examination, plaintiff

stated as follows:

(R.

Q

(By Mr. Snyder) But in truth and in fact, you
knew that you were going to have to buy a
refrigerator for that condominium, and you were
going to have to put some drapes in it, and
that type of thing, and you knew that in connection
wit the purchase of the condominium, and you
contemplated doing .that at the time of the
Decree, isn't that true? You may not have
known the price, but you knew you were going to
have to get a refrigerator and drapes?

A

(By Mrs. Christiansen) I knew I was going to
have to get a refrigerator. Kent gave me
$16,000.00, and I paid down $15,000.00, so I
figured the extra thousand I could use on a
fridge and a few things. But I just didn't--!
guess I figured that, but I didn't realize that
the drapes and all those things would come to
so much. Am I saying too much?

114)

It 1s clear from the plaintiff's own testimony that the
loan to pay for drapes and refrigerator in connection with
the purchase of the condominium came about largely because
of the plaintiff's own expensive taste and was a discretionary
expense rather than something that was necessary for the
welfare and benefit of the children.
It is even more clear that the purchase of the condominium
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by the plaintiff was contemplated by and took place contempor-

aniously with the entry of the Decree of Divorce.·

It should

be abundantly clear from the plaintiff's owri testimony that
her monthly expenses were $800.00 at the time of the Decree
of Divorce and that they increased by approximately $365.00
(See Plaintiff's Exhibit 3) for the home and utility expenses
immediately upon the purchase of the condominium, ,.. Furthermore,
parties contemplated that the $1,200.00 paid by the d~fendant
as alimony and support took into consideration the increased
expenses incurred by the plaintiff in the purchase of the
condominium.

The trial court cannot now use those new

living facilities and the increased expenses in connection
therewith to justify further increases in child support for
the parties' two minor children.
The trial court also considered the plaintiff's increased
expenses for child care of $250.00 per month which were
necessitated by her obtaining employment (R. 45).

The

difficulty with that proposition is that the trial court
again completely disregarded the increased income of the
plaintiff and the plaintiff's current ability to participate
in and provide funds for the support of the parties' minor
chiidren.

It is redundant to continu~ to note the previous

findings of the court that the plaintiff had no income at
the time of the Decree of Divorce and that at the time of
the modification hearing, she had gross income of approximately $800.00 and net income of approximately $550.0q but
certainly if the court is not going to consider the plaintiff's
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increased income as bearing on the issue of decreasing the
alimony, then the court ought to consider the plaintiff's
increased income as bearing on her ability to

provide for

the financial support of the parties' minor children.

It is

difficult to understand how the trial court can only consider
expenses which are necessitated by the plaintiff's obtaining
employment without considering income that is generated and
inures to the benefit of the plaintiff and the parties'
minor children resulting from that employment.
The only other increased expenses that were considered
by the court in connection with the modification and increase
1n the amount of child support payments were a general
observation about inflation and dancing and other lessons
for the children which were given only minimal weight by the
court.

(R. 45-46).

Considering the length of time between

the entry of the Decree of Divorce and the subsequent modification
hearing (a total time period of slightly more than two
years), it is difficult to justify a sixty-four percent
(64%) increase in the total amount of child support based
u~n

inflationary increases which probably totaled something

in the neighborhood of ten percent

(~0%)

per year.

Although they are not mentioned in the trial court's
Decision {Appendix A), plaintiff also claimed increased
automobile expenses resulting from her trading in a 1975
Mustang I I automobile which was fully paid for and purchasing
a 1980 Chevrolet Camara automobile which was not.

-27-

(R. 102).
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Similarly, the washer ana dryer referred to on Plaintiff's
Exhibit 3, and for which plaintiff claimed increased expenses
in the amount of $65.00 per month, was· not even purchased
until after the filing of the Order to Show Cause in Re
Modification by the plaintiff and had not been delivered to
the defendant's residence at the time of the trial of this
matter.

(R. 103-104).

The medical bills and expenses

incurred by the plaintiff have been continuously paid for by
the defendant as a courtesy to his former wife.

(R. 148).

Clearly, such expenses are either discretionary expenses
(in the case of the automobile and the washer and dryer) or
are expenses which are not properly chargeable to the defendant
since he was already paying for them anyway (such as the
medical expenses) and were properly excluded from the trial
court's consideration in connection with the Decision rendered
by the court.

B.

(See Appendix A).

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN CONSIDERING

DEFENDANT'S PRESENT GROSS INCOME AND COMPARING THAT WITH HIS
NET INCOME AT THE TIME OF THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.
Paragraph 19 of the original Findings of Fact entered
on July 17, 1979 herein provides:

8. The defendant is a self-employed dentist
with a net income of approximately $30,000.00
for the calendar year 1978.
(Emphasis added, R. 19).
The trial court's Decision (Appendix A) contains the
following paragraph:
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In addition ta· the foregoing, the defendant
has increased his gross income considerably
since the Decree of Divorce was entered when
his net income was approximately $30,000.00
per year.
His present mode of doing business
through a professional corporation and payment
of a salary is not indicative of the real earnings
of the defendant.
This especially true in the
1980-81 period since 1979 included a $41,000.00
loss item which does not appear in subsequent
returns.
In addition, an increase of approximately $19,000.00 has been established in the
gross earnings in the 1980-81 period.
(R.

46).

At the conclusion of the trial of this matter, defendant
was ordered to furnish the court with copies of his 1979 and
1980 individual income tax returns as well as his 1980
corporate income tax

return~

Those tax returns were furnished

to the court by counsel for the defendant and appear in this
Court's Exhibit Packet although, with the exception of the
1980 individual tax return, they are not labeled as exhibits.
The defendant testified that he incorporated his business
as a professional corporation in June of 1980 (R. 129).

He

further testified that he was paying himself a salary which
amounts to approximately $36,000.00 net per year (R. 134).
Defendant further testified that his alimony and child
support payments are made from out of his salary and that he
pays the other expenses which were listed on defendant's
Exhibit 6 from out of his net earnings (R. 134-136).

Defendant

also testified that the corporation had not paid any dividends
excepting an amount that was used to fund the tail-end of a
Keogh retirement program.

The---defendant has received no

dividends whatsoever and he is still living in a
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rented apartment and off of ·his relatively modest salary
which has increased approximately $6,000.00 over a two year
period (R. 134).
or luxurious

There is certainly no evidence of lavish

living on the part of the defendant and it is

clear that the gross income from his dental practice is put
right back into the corporation to pay leases, salaries,.
equipment, retirement plans, taxes, etc. (R. 135).

The

trial court's Decision (Appendix A) concerning the defendant's
income and ability to pay increases in child support should
have been based on his annual net income as was considered
in the original Findings of Fact, not on the defendant's
gross earnings and particularly not on the gross earnings of
the defendant's corporation.
It is clear from the record that the defendant's increase
in net income has only been approximately twenty percent
(20%) over a two year period and that his income barely
satisfies his own expenses, including his alimony and child
support obligation, as well as the cost of the medical
expenses that he pays on behalf of the plaintiff.

The

monthly budget submitted by the defendant on Exhibit 6
contains few, if anyr luxury items and was not even crossexamined by counsel for the plaintiff.

Comparing the net

income of the defendant recited in the original Findings of
Fact entered at the time of the Decree of Divorce and the
gross income referred to in the trial court's Decision
(Appendix

A)

is tantamount to comparing apples and oranges
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and should not form a basis upon which child support can be
increased.
Defendant submits that the evidence when properly
considered by the trial court compels the conclusion that
the plaintiff's expenses have not increased significantly
since the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce. In addition,
any major increases in connection with the acquisition of
new living facilities by the plaintiff were contemplated by
the parties at. the time they entered into the Stipulation
and Prqperty Settlement Agreement and occurred contemporaniously
with the.entry of the Decree of Divorce.

Furthermore, the

court's finding that the.plaintiff's personal needs have not
materially increased in that she has now obtained employment
and is partially providing.for her own support mandates that
the court either consider the plaintiff's income in reducing
alimony payments or that the court consider plaintiff's
income as bearing on her ability to provide some of the
economic support for the parties' minor children.

Defendant

further submits that the defendant's net income has had only
a marginal increase which is consistent with the inflationary
economy and that the trial court's attempts to compare the
net income referred to in the Findings of Fact entered at
the time of the Decree of Divorce with gross income· reflected
on the defendant's personal and corporate tax returns is
like attempting to compare apples and oranges.

Defendant

respectfully requests this Court to reverse the increase in
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child support payments ordered herein.
POINT III
DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE REQUIREMENT
THAT HE MAINTAIN THE PLAINTIFF ON HIS HEALTH
AND MEDICAL INSURANCE ELIMINATED FROM THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE.
In the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause filed by the
defendant herein, defendant requested that the court eliminate
the requirement from the Decree of Divorce that the defendant
be required to maintain the plaintiff on his health and
medical insurance policy (R. 38).

The trial court in its

Decision did not specifically rule on that question but

presumably

denied defendant's request.

With regard to the question of insurance, plaintiff
testified as follows:
Q (By Mr. Snyder) And you~ in fact, have had
your own medical insurance during that period
of time available through your own employment,
isn't that true?
A

{By Mrs. Christiansen)

Yes, sir.

•

•

•

(R. 108).

Defendant submits that the need for defendant to obtain
medical insurance for the plaintiff's benefit has been
obviated by reason of the plaintiff's obtaining employment
and her employment providing that medical insurance for her.
Plaintiff has voluntarily chosen to purchase medical insurance covering herself through her employment and the coverage provided by the defendant herein merely duplicates that
coverage.

Defendant should not be forced to pay for
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plaintiff's out-of-pocket medical expenses and provide major
medical insurance coverage for the plaintiff if she has her
own insurance available and if that insurance provides
duplicate coverage (R. 92, 108, 148).
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN MAKING AN AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES OR ALTERNATIVELY THE
ATTORNEY FEES AWARDED HEREIN SHOULD BE
REDUCED.
Section 30-30-3 Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended
provides:
The court may order either party to pay to the
clerk a sum of money for the separate support
and maintenance of the adverse party and the
children, and to enable such party to prosecute
or defend the action.
That section follows the provisions of Section 30-3-1
which defines the procedure, residence and grounds for
obtaining a decree of divorce and Section 30-3-2 which
indicates that a husband shall have the same rights as a
wife to obtain a decree of divorce.

There is nowhere in any

of the statutes that defendant's counsel has ever found a
provision that authorizes an award of attorney's fees in a
post divorce modification proceeding.

Defendant submits

that the provisions of Section 30-3-3 were drafted for the
purpose of authorizing an award of costs or attorney fees to
enable a party to pursue or defend a divorce action and that
the provisions of Section 30-3-3 were not intended to apply
in modification proceedings.

Defendant submits that this

Court should clarify whether or not provisions of Section
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30-3-3 should apply to permit awards of attorney fees in
post divorce modification proceedings.
The court herein received evidence from plaintiff's
counsel that his time and attorney's fees in this matter
were worth $180.00 (R. 152).

There was contrary evidence

introduced by the defendant to the effect that the plaintiff
had indicated to the defendant that she was not being charged
attorney's fees because the individual she had been dating
prior to the initiation of the Order to Show Cause was an
attorney and had arranged with Mr. Allen K. Young, attorney
for the plaintiff, to represent her on a "freebee" basis (R.
151).

In spite of that testimony, the court awarded attorney

fees of $200.00 which exceeds the amount requested by counsel
for the plaintiff.

Defendant submits that the award of

attorney fees herein should by eliminated or at least reduced
to the amount of $180.00.
CONCLUSION

Defendant submits that he has demonstrated a material
change in circumstances which justifies the court in reducing
the amount of alimony payments as set forth in the original
Decree of Divorce.

The specific findings of the trial court

entered at the time of the Decree of Divorce as reflected in
the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement, (Appendix
B), the Minute Entry, (Appendix C), and the Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, together with the uncontroverted
evidence of the plaintiff's present earning capacity, justify
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a reversal of the trial court's refusal to reduce the alimony
award or alternatively mandate the conclusion that the case
should be remanded to have the trial court determine an
appropriate amount for the reduction of alimony.
The expenses cited by the plaintiff to justify a need
for increases in child support are either in the nature of
expenses that were contemplated by the parties at the time
of the Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and
were in connection with the purchase of the plaintiff's new
condominium, or ·are in the nature of discretionary expenses
incurred by the plaintiff,and should not be used to penalize
the defendant by ordering increased child support.

The

trial court's observations in its Decision, (Appendix A),
that the plaintiff's personal needs have not materially
increased in that she now has obtained employment and is
providing partially for her own support (R. 46), further
compel the conclusion that either the plaintiff's income
must be considered in reducing the amount of alimony ordered
hereunder or must be considered 1n connection with the child
support payments ordered herein since the plaintiff is now
clearly capable of participating in and providing for the
economic support of the parties' minor children.

Further-

more, the court has engaged in a convoluted anaylsis which
compares the defendant's net income at the time of the
Decree of Divorce with his present gross income uses that
analysis to justify an increase in child support based upon

-35-
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the defendant's increased earning capacity.
Defendant further submits that he is entitled to an
order of this Court eliminating the requirement that he
maintain the plaintiff on his health and medical insurance
policy and for a reduction or elimination of the attorney
fees as awarded herein.
DATED this 2l{ft_day of February, 1982 •

. f?-~.'

JtrA, £=i~

CRAIG M. tNYDER, for: .
. .
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN
120 East 300 North
Provo, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
MAILED two (2) copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant

to Mr. Allen K. Young, Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent,
350 East Center, Provo, Utah, 84601, this

~day

of February,

·19 82.
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APPENDIX "A"
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN,

Civil Case No. 51,095

Plaintiff,
vs.
KENT CHRISTIANSEN,

D E C I S I 0 N

Decision.

This matter came before the Court on the 3rd day of September,
1981, Allen K. Young, Esq., appearing for the plaintiff and Craig M.

-

Snyder, Esq., appearing for the defendant.

Plaintiff first applied

. 4!

to the Court for an Order to Show Cause why the support provision
of the Decree of Divorce should not be increased for the two minor
children of the parties, to which the defendant has counterpetitioned for a reduction of the alimony

or child support

awarded by the Decree of Divorce, which was stipulated to by the
parties.

The parties presented their evidence and copies of the

defendant's income tax returns were secured for the Court's
inspection, and the Court having taken the matter under advisement
and having fully considered same, now enters the following:
DECISION
The Court finds that the expenses of plaintiff in rearing the
minor children have increased hy virtue of inflation since the
entry of the Decree herein on July 17, 1979, although the expenses
of the minor children were not established by any findings of fact
or stipulations on file herein at the time the Decree was entered.
TheCourt further finds that there have been other increases
iD that the plaintiff has acquired new living facilities for herself and the children and having obtained employment has an
inc~e~sed

\

expe~ses

expense of $250.00 per month for child care.
such as dancing and other lessons for the
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Other

~hildren

are

APPENDIX

II

A"

given only minimal weight by the Court in arriving at the increase
in child support that is justifiable under the changed circ~~stances
of the children's needs.
In addition to the foregoing, the defendant has increased his
gross income considerably since the Decree of Divorce was entered
when his net income was approximately $30,000.00 per year.

His

present mode of doing business through a personal corporation and
payment of a salary is not indicative of the real e_arnings of the
defendant.

This especially true in the 1980-81 period since 1979

included a $41,000.00 loss item which does not appear in subsequent
returns.

In addition, an increase of approximately

$1~,ooo.oo

has

been established in the gross earnings in the 1980-81 period.
Based upon the above and foregoing findings, and upon the
finding in the Decree of Divorce that only the plaintiff's
economic needs, without regard to defendant's income, is the sole
basis for increase in alimony and the further finding by the Court
that plaintiff's personal needs have not materially increased in
that she has now obtained employment and is providing partially for
her own support, the Court concludes as follows:
1.

That the child support payable by the defendant to plaintiff

for the support and maintenance of his two minor children should be
increased the additional sum of $175.00 per month per child, making
the total sum per month of $450.00 per month per child, the same
payable semi-monthly together with alimony at such time as in the
original Decree provided.
2.

The Court further concludes that a sufficient change of

circumstance has not been shown to justify the reduction or
elimination of the alimony paid by defendant to plaintiff, and the
amount provided in the original Decree shall continue.
3.

The Court further finds that the defendant should pay to

the plaintiff for the use and benefit of her attorney, Allen K.
Young, the sum of $200.00 for his services herein, which the

Cour~
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APPENDIX "A"

finds

is reasonable.

Defendant to pay .the costs incurred herein.

counsel for the plaintiff is directed to ?repare an appropriate amendment to the Decree of Divorce consistent with the
foregoing Decision.
Dated at Provo, Utah County, Utah this

f 77 day

of October,

1981.
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APPENDIX "8" '
WAYNE B. WATSON, OF
GROW & WATSON
Attorneys for Defendant
1325 South 800 East
Suite 310
Orem, Utah 84057
Telephone:
225-8300
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN,
Plaintiff,

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

vs.
Civil No. 51,095
KENT CHRISTIANSEN,
Defendant .
.WHEREAS, the Plaintiff above named has commenced an action
for divorce against the Defendant, and

-

WHEREAS, it is the desire and intention of the parties

~

hereto to dispose of their property rights and other rights and
obligations arising out of their marriage in the event a Decree
of Divorce is granted by the Court onthe Plaintiff's Complaint.
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual execution
of this Agreement, the parties hereto hereby Stipulate and Agree,
subject to the approval of the above-entitled Court, that in the
event a Decree of Divorce is entered on the Plaintiff's Complaint,
that the said Decree may contain the following provisions and
that the same may be incorporated therein.
1.

The Defendant hereby agrees that the Answer previously

filed in this matter may be withdrawn and

reques~the

Court to

.

treat this matter as a default, requiring no further notice to
him.
2.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded the care, custody and

control of Alicia Christiansen and Chad Christiansen, the two
minor children of the parties hereto, subject to the rights of
the Defendant to

visi~

with said children at reasonable times and

places, and under reasonable circumstances.
3.

The Defendant shall pay to the Plaintiff the sum

$275.00 ?er month per child, child support, to assist in
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APPENDIX "B" CONTINUED ..
2

support and maintenance of each of the minor children of the
parties hereto, together with $650.00 per month alimony.

Said

payments shall be made in equal semi-monthly installments of
$600.00 each, on or before the 1st and 15th days of each month
commencing August 1, 1979, and continuing thereafter on the 1st
and 15th days of each month until the Court otherwise orders.
4.

The Defendant shall pay and discharge any and all

outstanding debts and obligations of the parties hereto incurred
prior to their separation and shall hold the Plaintiff harmless
from further liability thereon.
5.

That the Defendant shall maintain hospital and medical

insurance policies in full force and effect on the Plaintiff and
the minor children of the parties with an annual deductible not
to exceed $100.00.

It is expressly understood that in the event

Plaintiff remarries, Defendant will not be responsible for
maintaining a hospital and medical insurance policy for her
benefit.
6.

The Plaintiff shall be awarded as her sole and separate

property the 1975 Ford Mustang automobile, together with any and
all personal property in her possession as of the date of this
Stipulation.
7.

The Defendant shall be awarded as his sole and

separat~

property the 1978 Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile, together with
any and all personal property in his possession as of the date
of this Stipulation, including all business property accounts and
equipment.

In lieu of any claims upon the business or any other

property acquired by the parties during their marriage, except for
such properties as the Plaintiff has in her possession, the Defendant shall pay to her the sum of $16,000.00 cash upon approval
of this Stipulation by the Court.
8.

The Defendant shall pay to the PJaintiff the sum of

$375.00 for the use and benefit of her attorney herein, together
with costs in the amount of $25.00.
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APPENDIX "B" CONTINUED
3

9.

The parties further stipulate

th~t

they hereby

request the Court to make a finding of fact that the Plaintiff
presently has no

inco~e,

and that future increases in alimony

shall be based solely upon Plaintiff's economic needs without
any regard whatsoever to a possible increase in Defendant's
income status.
10.

Each of the parties acknowledge that they have read

the foregoing Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement and
understand the contents thereof; that there have been no
promises or representations made by either party to the other to
induce the execution of this Agreement which are not specifically
set forth herein.
DATED this

J3

day of July, 1979.

(1 '14/ {!, (11l i.~",~1Ud

.__/

~NA C. CHRISTIAN~EN, Plaintiff

.a~1<1Y&~
. WATSON,

WA~

vi;· ; '/ :

-~, ,. . . .\

,

i

'

(1_
\.. '·. -t-,, ·-'~,'. - 0-· ,·.._
l; -•.•.·\...- :
\
l
)
.._
KENT CHRISTIANSEN, Defendant

Ai:(!;,6rney for Defendant
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APPENDIX "C"

In the fourth Judicial District Court
of the St.ate ol Utah

In and For Utah County
JANA C. CHRISTIANSEN,
MINUTE ENTRY
CASE NUMBER
DATED

KENT CHRISTIANSEN,

51 , 09 5

July 17, 1979

George E. Ballif

JUDGZ

Reported by Myron A. Frazier, C.S.R.

DIVORCE

-

n

This was the time set for trial in the above captioned matter.
The plaintiff was present and represented by counsel Noall T. Wootton. The
defendant was not present but was represented by counsel Wayne B. Watson.
Mr. Wootton addressed the court and represented the defendant has
withdrawn his answer &agreed to his default being entered through the sti pu1ati on and property settlement agreement. Mr. Watson concurred in those representations.
Jana C. Christiansen was sworn and testified in her own behalf.
The court finds the material allegations are true and correct and
the plaintiff is awarded a decree of divorce from the defendant on the grounds
of mental cruelty.
The court approved the stipulation and property settlement agreement and ordered the decree entered consistent therewith. Counsel stated for
the record that plaintiff has 0" income at this time.
For good cause shown the decree to become final upon its signing
by the court and entry by the clerk in the register of actions.
11
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